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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Although the Internet is an important resource for America’s 
youth, the anonymity provided by the shield of technology has also 
made the Internet a fertile ground for child pornographers and sex-
ual predators. All levels of government are hurrying to impose laws 
that will protect children as they venture out, often unsupervised, 
into cyberspace. Laws enacted by Congress and the states have come 
under constitutional attack by civil rights organizations. These at-
tacks have invalidated much of the legislation, despite the strong 
governmental interest in protecting children. An emerging constitu-
tional doctrine strongly protects information on the Internet and fa-
vors federal regulation over state regulation. Aware of these consti-
tutional issues, the 2001 Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 144 
(SB 144) to criminalize the transmission of child pornography to per-
sons in Florida and the transmission of images “harmful to minors” 
to minors in Florida. 
 This article discusses the provisions of SB 144 and the constitu-
tional issues raised by the bill. Like its predecessors in other states, 
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the bill likely will come under constitutional scrutiny. Civil rights 
groups are likely to argue that the bill violates both the First 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. De-
spite the legislature’s obvious attempt to narrowly craft the legisla-
tion, different portions of the bill are more likely or less likely to sur-
vive this scrutiny, depending on the significance of the state’s inter-
est in regulating the type of prohibited content. Weighing these sig-
nificant constitutional interests is a daunting task. The final judicial 
decision, regardless of its outcome, will undoubtedly fuel the debate 
about which governmental entity is best suited to regulate conduct 
and content on the Internet, and to what extent the Constitution re-
strains state governments from regulating the Internet. 
II.   THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN  
ON THE INTERNET 
 The Internet is the fastest growing communication medium in 
American society. As with any new technology, younger generations 
have readily embraced the Internet. A study funded by the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children reported that in 1999 
nearly twenty-four million children between the ages of ten and 
seventeen regularly used the Internet, and that number was growing 
quickly.1 The Internet offers a vast array of educational and enter-
tainment opportunities that are beneficial to children and that would 
be unavailable to many children through traditional media. 
 Despite these obvious benefits, the Internet is more than an edu-
cational utopia. The anonymity provided by the shield of technology 
has given child pornographers and sexual predators a new vehicle for 
exploiting children. Victimization of children online usually occurs 
through two avenues. First, children can be victimized by the wide-
spread propagation of digital images of child pornography. Digital 
imaging technology has made reproducing images of child pornogra-
phy in electronic format easy and inexpensive. Once such images are 
digitized, they can be distributed via many different media, such as 
e-mail, file transfer protocol (ftp), the World Wide Web, or direct com-
puter-to-computer connections. The second primary avenue for child 
exploitation is direct sexual solicitation of children while they are 
online. Sexual predators often use pornographic images to coax 
children to meet them in an offline encounter. The Online Victimiza-
tion Report found that children often encountered “sexual solicita-
                                                                                                                    
 1. David Finkelhor et al., Crimes Against Children Research Center, Online Victimi-
zation: A Report on the Nation’s Youth viii (2000), available at http://www.ncmec.org [here-
inafter Online Victimization Report]. For a summary of the survey results in the report, see 
Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Risk Factors for and Impact of Online Sexual Solicitation of 
Youth, 285 JAMA 3011 (2001). 
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tions they did not want, sexual material they did not seek, and peo-
ple who threatened and harassed them in a variety of ways.”2 While 
many children disregarded these sexual advances, others were emo-
tionally impacted by these encounters.3 
 The Online Victimization Report surveyed 1501 children, asking 
questions about the children’s online experiences.4 Of those children 
surveyed, about one in five was sexually solicited while online in the 
last year.5 One in thirty-three survey respondents was aggressively 
solicited; that is, a solicitor asked to meet them somewhere, called 
them, or sent them money or gifts.6 About one-fourth of the children 
receiving these solicitations felt distressed by them, but very few re-
ported the incident to a parent and even fewer reported incidents to 
the authorities.7 
 The Online Victimization Report also indicated that the law en-
forcement community was not effectively educating parents and chil-
dren about how to deal with these sexual advances. Of the incidents 
reported in the survey, less than ten percent were reported to the au-
thorities and most parents could not name a specific authority to 
which they could make a report.8 The authors concluded: 
[Y]outh encounter a substantial quantity of offensive episodes, 
some of which are distressing and most of which are unreported. A 
comprehensive strategy to respond to the problem would aim to 
reduce the quantity of offensive behavior, better shield young peo-
ple from its likely occurrence, increase the level of reporting, and 
provide more help to youth and families to protect them from any 
consequences.9 
III.   LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILDREN ONLINE 
 In recent years, Congress and the states have passed many pieces 
of legislation attempting to deal with the problem of sexual exploita-
tion of children on the Internet. Many of these laws have come under 
constitutional attack. Congress’s first attempt at regulating the 
transmission of pornography to children was the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), which passed as part of the Telecommu-
                                                                                                                    
 2. Online Victimization Report, supra note 1, at vii. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at ix. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. This amounts to more than 45 of the 1501 children surveyed. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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nications Act of 1996.10 The CDA prohibited the transmission in in-
terstate or foreign commerce of obscene or indecent images to any re-
cipient under the age of eighteen.11 The CDA also prohibited know-
ingly sending or displaying patently offensive material in a manner 
that was available to persons under eighteen.12 A person who en-
gaged in the prohibited conduct was subject to fines or criminal pen-
alties. The CDA provided two affirmative defenses for persons who 
made good faith efforts to restrict access to the prohibited material 
by minors.13 The Supreme Court eventually struck down the CDA as 
a content-based regulation of speech that was unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad.14 
 In response to the ruling striking down the CDA and in an at-
tempt to address the Court’s concerns, Congress passed the Child 
Online Protection Act (COPA).15 COPA prohibits any individual or 
entity from knowingly making a communication using the World 
Wide Web for commercial purposes when that communication is 
available to minors and is harmful to minors.16 Congress intended 
COPA to limit the scope of the content prohibition to commercial 
speech on the Web that is harmful to minors. Like the CDA, COPA 
also provides affirmative defenses for Web publishers who restrict 
access to minors by requiring a form of identification that proves the 
accessing person is not a minor.17 Persons or entities that violate the 
                                                                                                                    
 10. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). The CDA is found in Title V of the Tele-
communication Act. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 502, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)-(e) 
(1994 & Supp. II 1996). Apparently, the Senate amended the CDA onto the Act without a 
hearing, and several members of the House of Representatives objected to the amendment. 
These members felt the amendment would only result in legal challenges. For an abbrevi-
ated summary of the history of the passage of the CDA, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
857-60 (1997). 
 11. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 12. Id. § 223(d). 
 13. Id. § 223(e)(5). One affirmative defense was provided for “good faith, reasonable, 
effective and appropriate” actions to restrict access to minors as feasible under existing 
technology. Id. § 223(e)(5)(A). The other affirmative defense was provided for using credit 
card, debit card, adult access codes, or adult personal identification numbers. Id. § 
223(e)(5)(B). 
 14. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872-74. The Court, noting the lack of historical gov-
ernment regulation of Internet content, applied strict scrutiny, stating, “our cases provide 
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium.” Id. at 870. The Court noted that the CDA’s breadth was “wholly unprecedented” 
because it applied to all content on the Internet, both commercial and noncommercial. Id. 
at 877. The Court also stated: “We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the 
First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech.” Id. at 874. 
 15. Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C., title XIV, § 1403, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 231 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
 16. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1). 
 17. Id. § 231(c)(1)(C). This provision provides a variety of permissible age verification 
mechanisms including credit cards, debit cards, adult access codes, adult personal identifi-
cation numbers, digital certificates that verify age, or “any other reasonable measures that 
are feasible under available technology.” Id. 
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prohibitions are subject to criminal penalties and substantial fines.18 
While noting the government’s compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from harmful material, the Third Circuit recently affirmed a 
preliminary injunction that prevented COPA’s enforcement, holding 
that COPA was more likely than not unconstitutionally overbroad.19 
The Supreme Court has accepted the case for review during the Oc-
tober 2001 term.20 
 In addition to Congress’s attempts to regulate online pornography, 
numerous states have attempted to pass legislation to address the is-
sue. Nearly every state statute that has faced constitutional chal-
lenge in federal court has been invalidated.21 Most of these statutes 
have been held unconstitutional violations of either the First 
Amendment or the Commerce Clause, or both. 
IV.   FLORIDA’S ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 
 In the 2001 session, the Florida Legislature enacted SB 144, 
which attempts to address the problem of child pornography and the 
transmission of images harmful to minors via the Internet. In the 
1999 session, the legislature created the Information Service Tech-
nology Development Task Force to study several issues related to 
government and technology.22 One such issue was the sufficiency of 
Florida’s criminal laws to deal with Internet-related crimes. The 
Task Force released its report in February 2001 and recommended 
that the legislature enact a law proscribing the transmission of child 
pornography and the transmission of pornographic images to minors 
in Florida.23 Apparently, this recommendation was in response to an 
increasing number of widely publicized incidents of sexual solicita-
tion and exploitation in Florida24 and a bill that had been debated in 
                                                                                                                    
 18. Id. § 231(a)(2). 
 19. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. ACLU 
v. Ashcroft, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001). 
 20. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 121 S. Ct. 1997. 
 21. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (invalidating N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (Michie Supp. 1998)); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611 
(W.D. Va. 2000) (invalidating VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-391 (Michie Supp. 1999)); Cyberspace 
Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (invalidating MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 722.675(1) (2000)); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (invalidating N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney’s 1997)). 
 22. See Ch. 99-354, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws 3606, 3614. 
 23. INFORMATION SERVICE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE, 2001 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE INFORMATION SERVICE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE, at 113 
(Feb. 14, 2001) (on file with the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Informa-
tion Technology) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 24. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro et al., Broward Teachers’ Union Chief Accused of Com-
puter Child-Porn, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2001, at 4B; Tony Bridges, Man Facing Charges 
After Ex-Girlfriend Finds Child Porn, TALLAHASSEE DEM., Apr. 28, 2001, at 2B; Dad Helps 
Nab Rabbi in Web-Sex Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 8, 2001, at B3; Former Orlando 
Attorney Convicted of Internet Sex Offenses, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Feb. 17, 2001; Lisa Fuss, 
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the 2000 legislative session.25 The Task Force also recommended that 
civil immunity be provided for persons who report such crimes, but 
that a mandatory reporting requirement not be enacted.26 Noting ju-
risdictional problems with addressing the issue, the Task Force nev-
ertheless felt the legislature could effectively draft a criminal law 
that would protect Florida’s minors.27 SB 144 represents the 2001 
legislature’s implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations. 
Both the House and the Senate heard bills addressing the issue,28 
with SB 144 resulting as the compromise measure that the legisla-
ture enacted. The Governor signed SB 144 on May 25, 2001, and the 
law became effective on July 1, 2001. 
 SB 144, entitled “an act relating to computer crimes,” contains 
numerous “Whereas” clauses demonstrating the legislature’s findings 
that criminalization of transmission of child pornography and images 
harmful to minors was necessary to protect Florida’s children.29 Re-
garding child pornography, the legislature found that the use of mi-
nors in pornographic images was harmful to the psychological well-
being of minors and that the dissemination of such images by any 
means resulted in a continuing, irreparable injury to the minor who 
was the subject of the image.30 Related to sexual solicitation of chil-
dren, the legislature found that pornographic images were frequently 
used to entice minors to engage in improper sexual activity that was 
harmful to their emotional well-being.31 The legislature further found 
that “the advent . . . of the Internet and other electronic devices has 
greatly facilitated transmission of child pornography and images . . . 
harmful to minors.”32 
 SB 144 created and revised numerous definitions in section 
847.001, Florida Statutes, the definitional section for Florida’s chap-
ter on computer crimes.33 The bill defined the term “child pornogra-
phy” as “any image depicting a minor engaged in sexual conduct.”34 
                                                                                                                    
Man Facing More Child Porn Counts, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 2, 2001, at 5B; Matthew 
Henry, Police: Worker Had Kiddie Porn, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Apr. 19, 2001, at BV1; 
Lawyer Guilty in Internet Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 2001, at B3; Man Arrested, 
Charged in Assault of Teen, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 14, 2001, at 3B; Brigid O’Malley, 
North Naples Man Arrested on Child Pornography Charges, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, June 8, 
2001, at D1; Andreas Tzortzis, Officer Arrested on Sex Charges, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, 
June 22, 2001, at A1. 
 25. Fla. HB 895 (2000).  
 26. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 113. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Fla. CS for CS for SB 144 (2001); Fla. HB 203 (2001).  
 29. Fla. CS for CS for SB 144 (2001) (Second Engrossed); see also Act effective July 1, 
2001, 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 54, at 345-46. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 3. 
 33. Id. at 5. 
 34. Fla. SB 144, § 1 (creating a new subsection (1) for FLA. STAT. § 847.001). 
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By using the term “sexual conduct,” the definition of child pornogra-
phy incorporates the broad definition of that term in subsection (16) 
of section 847.001.35 The bill also revised the definitions of “harmful 
to minors” and “person” to slightly expand their breadth.36 
 The bill created two new criminal statutes. The first, section 
847.0137, makes the electronic transmission of child pornography a 
third-degree felony.37 The second, section 847.0138, makes the 
transmission via e-mail of images “harmful to minors” to a minor in 
Florida a third-degree felony.38 The two statutes are distinct in their 
breadth and involve different constitutional analyses. 
A.   Transmission of Child Pornography 
 Section 847.0137 criminalizes the transmission of child pornogra-
phy by means of any electronic equipment or device. To commit the 
prohibited act, a defendant must “transmit” child pornography.39 The 
term “transmit” was broadly defined to include various types of data 
and various transfer mechanisms. Specifically, to “transmit” means 
to send or cause to be delivered “any image, information or data.”40 
The definition appears to include both still images and animated 
video. Regarding the transfer mechanism, transmissions “through 
any medium, including the Internet, by use of any electronic equip-
ment or device” are included.41 The definition broadly contemplates 
any electronic transfer mechanism, including e-mail, fax, ftp, chat 
rooms, and direct user-to-user modem connections. A person who 
posted child pornography to a Web site would also “transmit” the im-
ages to get the images onto the site. However, this type of transmis-
sion does not appear to be within the scope of this bill because section 
847.0137(2) requires the transmission be made to another person, 
                                                                                                                    
 35. For the reader’s ease, further references to SB 144 will be made to the correspond-
ing section of Florida Statutes that SB 144 either creates or modifies. Section 847.001(16) 
defines the term “sexual conduct” to mean: 
actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bes-
tiality, masturbation, or sadomasochistic abuse; actual lewd exhibition of the 
genitals; actual physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, 
pubic area, buttocks, or, if such person is a female, breast with the intent to 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party; or any act or conduct which 
constitutes sexual battery or simulates that sexual battery is being or will be 
committed. A mother’s breastfeeding her baby does not under any circum-
stances constitute “sexual conduct.” 
FLA. STAT. § 847.001(16) (2001). 
 36. Id. § 847.001(6), (11). 
 37. Id. § 847.0137.  
 38. Id. § 847.0138.  
 39. Id. § 847.0137.  
 40. Id. § 847.0137(1)(b). 
 41. Id. 
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rather than to another computer.42 A broad definition of “transfer 
mechanisms” is probably necessary because a more narrow definition 
could mean that child pornographers could easily circumvent the law 
by using technologies not within the definition’s scope. 
 The bill provides that a criminal act has been committed when ei-
ther the source or the destination of a transmission of child pornog-
raphy was the State of Florida. Subsection (2) of section 847.0137 
provides that any person in Florida who knew or reasonably should 
have known that they were transmitting child pornography to any 
person, whether in Florida or not, commits a third degree felony.43 
Thus, where a person in Florida is the source of the prohibited 
transmission, the sender violates subsection (2). Subsection (3) of 
section 847.0137 provides that a person in any other jurisdiction who 
knew or reasonably should have known that they were transmitting 
child pornography to a person in Florida commits a third degree fel-
ony.44 Thus, where the destination of the prohibited transmission is a 
person in Florida, the sender violates subsection (3).45 
B.   Transmission of Images “Harmful to Minors”  
to Minors in Florida 
 SB 144 also creates section 847.0138, which prohibits the trans-
mission of images “harmful to minors” to a minor in Florida. The 
                                                                                                                    
 42. Possession of digital images of child pornography, however, are prohibited by sec-
tion 847.0135, Florida Statutes. Arguably anyone who posts an image to a Web site could 
be transmitting the image to another person because they are placing the image in a forum 
where they know Internet users are likely to view them. However, this type of “indirect 
transmission” does not appear to be contemplated by the statute. A person who views a 
Web site with child pornography might also appear to transmit the image because, by ac-
cessing the Web site, they are causing the child pornography to be delivered to themselves. 
However, the knowledge requirement in section 847.0137(2) appears to ensure that unwit-
ting Internet users who stumble onto child pornography do not fall within this prohibition. 
 43. FLA. STAT. § 847.0137(2). 
 44. Id. § 847.0137(3). 
 45. Whether a person can reasonably be expected to know that Florida is the destina-
tion of a communication transmitted via the Internet is likely to be a subject of debate in 
any challenge to the bill. For reasons discussed infra Parts V.B.1 and V.B.2, courts have 
noted that determining the geographic location of a person on the Internet is very difficult, 
if not impossible. Note, however, that the broad definition of the term “transmit” could in-
clude instances, such as by fax or direct-dial, where, because of the receiver’s area code, the 
sender should reasonably know Florida is the destination. 
 Additionally, prosecution of out-of-state offenders raises jurisdictional concerns. The leg-
islature attempted to address these concerns in subsection (5) of section 847.0137 by pro-
viding that any person over whom Florida has jurisdiction pursuant to chapter 910 would 
be subject to prosecution in Florida for a violation of subsection (3). FLA. STAT. § 
847.0137(5). Section 910.005 sets out the criminal jurisdiction of the state of Florida. See 
id. § 910.005. Subsection (2) of section 910.005 provides that if either the conduct that is an 
element of the offense or the result occurs in Florida, then Florida has jurisdiction. Id. § 
910.005(2). While jurisdiction is arguable, the result of a transmission of child pornography 
to a Florida resident is the Florida resident’s reception of the transmission, and thus juris-
diction could be properly asserted. 
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term “harmful to minors” is defined in section 847.001(6) and would 
generally include adult pornography.46 The statutory definition of 
“harmful to minors” incorporates the constitutional standard estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California.47 Apparently in 
recognition of the constitutional issues related to restricting trans-
mission of adult pornography on the Internet, the legislature drafted 
a much more narrow prohibition in section 847.0138. First, the defi-
nition of “transmit” is much narrower in scope. Unlike the all-
encompassing definition in section 847.0137, a person only “trans-
mits” under section 847.0138 when the person sends “to a specific in-
dividual known by the defendant to be a minor via electronic mail.”48 
Thus, e-mail is the only regulated transmission mechanism, and 
posting adult pornography on a Web site would not violate the stat-
ute. Additionally, for the defendant to “know” the recipient is a mi-
nor, the defendant must have had actual knowledge or have believed 
that the recipient was a minor.49 
 Section 847.0138 criminalizes the transmission of images harmful 
to minors when the defendant knew or believed the recipient was a 
minor. Violation of the statute is a third-degree felony.50 Subsection 
(2) of section 847.0138 applies to persons in Florida who transmit the 
prohibited images to minors. Subsection (3) applies to persons out-
side the state who transmit images to minors. In either case, the mi-
nor to whom the defendant transmitted the image must be in Flor-
ida. 
                                                                                                                    
 46. As amended by the bill, section 847.001(4) defines the term “harmful to minors” to 
mean: 
any reproduction, imitation, characterization, description, exhibition, presenta-
tion, or representation, of whatever kind or form, depicting nudity, sexual con-
duct, or sexual excitement when it: 
(a) Predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of mi-
nors; 
(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a 
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and 
(c) Taken as a whole, is without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors. 
A mother’s breastfeeding of her baby is not under any circumstance “harmful to 
minors.”  
Id. § 847.001(4). 
 47. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 48. FLA. STAT. § 847.0138(1)(b). 
 49. Id. § 847.0138(1)(a). The test for knowledge seems to apply in two cases. The first 
case is where the defendant had actual knowledge. Second, if the defendant subjectively 
believed the recipient was a minor, the defendant would satisfy the knowledge require-
ment. It is unclear why the legislature chose to have a subjective standard for the second 
prong. While the test is consistent with the “knew or believed” test in subsection (2) of sec-
tion 847.0138, the test is inconsistent with the objective standard or reasonableness in sec-
tion 847.0137. Prosecution of the offense may be hindered by efforts to prove the defen-
dant’s subjective belief. The subjective standard may also pose constitutional questions. 
See discussion infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. 
 50. FLA. STAT. § 847.0138.  
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V.   CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY SB 144 
 The legislature was acutely aware of the constitutional difficulties 
that SB 144 posed and the significant likelihood that the bill would 
be challenged.51 State regulation of the transmission of content over 
the Internet has come under sharp constitutional attack. Nearly 
every law attempting to regulate in this area has been struck down 
as unconstitutional.52 There are two leading theories by which courts 
have struck down similar legislation. First, courts have held that 
statutes similar to those created by SB 144 violate the First Amend-
ment. Second, courts have held that state legislation similar to SB 
144 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. This part of the Article 
discusses the cases dealing with these two constitutional theories 
and their possible application to the provisions of SB 144. 
A.   The First Amendment Implications of SB 144 
 Several courts have found that state and federal legislation simi-
lar to SB 144 violates the First Amendment.53 Because SB 144 sin-
gles out two types of content, child pornography and images harmful 
to minors, the bill is a content-based regulation of speech. Generally, 
content-based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid and 
are subjected to strict scrutiny.54 For a content-based regulation of 
speech to survive strict scrutiny: (1) the government must have a 
compelling interest in regulating the speech, (2) the regulation must 
be narrowly tailored to meet the government’s compelling interest, 
and (3) the regulation must be the least restrictive means possible.55 
 The First Amendment analysis of the provisions of SB 144 differs 
based on the content being regulated in the different criminal stat-
utes. The cases clearly establish that states have a greater interest in 
regulating child pornography than in regulating adult pornography. 
As the First Circuit noted in United States v. Hilton: 
[S]exually explicit material may be seen to fall along a constitu-
tional continuum entitling it to varying degrees of protection. At 
one end of the spectrum, pictures of actual children in sexually 
compromising positions, deemed to have little or no social value, 
                                                                                                                    
 51. See Senate Staff Analysis for SB 144, and House Staff Analysis for HB 203, the 
Companion Measure to SB 144, available at http://www.leg.state.fl.us (last visited July 21, 
2001). 
 52. See cases cited supra note 21. 
 53. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-71 (1997); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 179 (3rd 
Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001); ACLU v. 
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 
611, 626 (W.D. Va. 2000); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 
751 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
 54. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 173. 
 55. Id. 
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are entitled to no constitutional protection. At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, non-obscene images involving actual adults are enti-
tled to full protection.56 
1.   The State’s Interest in Regulating Child Pornography 
 In New York v. Ferber,57 the Supreme Court unanimously upheld 
a New York statute that prohibited persons from knowingly promot-
ing a sexual performance by a child under age sixteen by distributing 
material that depicted such a performance.58 Rather than proceed 
with the traditional strict scrutiny analysis, the Court “believe[d] 
[its] inquiry should begin with the question of whether a State has 
somewhat more freedom in proscribing works which portray sexual 
acts or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by children.”59 The Court deter-
mined that states were entitled to “greater leeway” in the regulation 
of pornographic depictions of children but cautioned that statutes 
should be drafted to ensure that “the hand of the censor [not] become 
unduly heavy.”60 
 The Ferber Court cited five reasons why states were entitled to 
greater leeway in banning child pornography. First, states have a 
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors.61 Second, the distribution of photographs depicting 
child pornography were “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse the 
children suffered as a result of the creation of the images.62 Because 
the images were a permanent record of the sexual act, the images 
posed an ongoing injury to the child.63 Third, allowing a commercial 
market for child pornography would provide an economic incentive to 
produce materials that were uniformly outlawed.64 Fourth, the social 
value of permitting live performances and photographic reproduc-
tions of children engaged in sexual conduct was de minimis.65 Fifth, 
classifying child pornography as a category of content outside the 
                                                                                                                    
 56. 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 57. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 58. Id. at 750. 
 59. Id. at 753. 
 60. Id. at 756. 
 61. Id. at 756-57. The Court noted that “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.” Id. In 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-41 (1968), the Court had also held that states had 
a special interest in protecting youth and elevated the state’s role in protecting children 
through regulation of pornographic material above the state’s role in regulating exposure 
to the same content for consenting adults. 
 62. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
 63. Id. The Court also noted that the network for the dissemination of child pornogra-
phy must be closed in order for the market for the exploitative images to be eliminated. Id. 
 64. Id. at 761. 
 65. Id. at 762. 
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protection of the First Amendment was not contrary to the Court’s 
precedent.66 
 Although the Court broadly stated that child pornography was a 
category of speech outside protection of the First Amendment, the 
Court cautioned that legislation should be “adequately defined.”67 Be-
cause the New York statutes at issue clearly specified the applicable 
age of the image’s subject and defined what constituted “sexual con-
duct,” the statute was adequately defined.68 
 Eight years later, in Osborne v. Ohio,69 the Court was confronted 
with a state statute that banned the possession and viewing of child 
pornography, rather than its commercial dissemination. The Ohio 
statute banned the possession of any material that showed a minor, 
who was not the person’s child, in a state of nudity unless the mate-
rial was for a statutorily defined bona fide purpose or the child’s par-
ents consented in writing to the image’s production.70 In a prior case, 
Stanley v. Georgia,71 the Court struck down a Georgia statute that 
outlawed the private possession of obscene material because the 
statute unduly infringed upon an individual’s right to receive infor-
mation in the privacy of the individual’s home.72  
 The defendant in Osborne argued that Stanley limited the state’s 
ability to outlaw the possession of child pornography.73 The Court 
distinguished Stanley and upheld Ohio’s ban on the possession of 
child pornography.74 The protection of children through further ef-
forts to eradicate the market for child pornography justified Ohio’s 
ban.75 Reaffirming the state’s compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from sexual exploitation, the Court noted that banning posses-
sion was a reasonable method of attempting to reduce the demand 
for child pornography.76 The Court could not “fault Ohio for attempt-
ing to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.”77 
The ban on possession was further supported by evidence that, since 
the Ferber decision, the child pornography market had been driven 
underground, and so further regulation of commercial production 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Id. at 763. The Court noted that in other contexts, it had evaluated the content of 
speech and determined whether, based on the content, the speech was entitled to First 
Amendment protection. For instance, “fighting words” are unprotected. Id. (citing Young v. 
Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)). 
 67. Id. at 764. 
 68. Id. at 765-66.  
 69. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
 70. Id. at 106-07. 
 71. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 72. Id. at 564-68. 
 73. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 109. 
 76. Id. at 109-10. 
 77. Id. at 110. 
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and distribution had little effect.78 By banning possession, Ohio’s law 
encouraged persons possessing child pornography to destroy the im-
ages, thus ending the lasting injury to the child that the image rep-
resented. 
 The strength of the state’s compelling interest and the Court’s 
recognition that child pornography is a category of speech wholly 
outside First Amendment protection buttresses the constitutionality 
of the ban on the electronic transmission of child pornography that 
SB 144 establishes in section 847.0137. The legislative findings ac-
companying the substantive provisions of SB 144 specifically incor-
porate the constitutional justifications in Ferber.79 Moreover, just as 
child pornographers went underground subsequent to the Ferber de-
cision, they are using today’s technology to anonymously propagate 
exploitative images on the Internet in even greater quantities.80 Digi-
tal imaging technology allows child pornographers to cheaply develop 
and mass distribute images with little trace of their identity. The 
significant government interest in addressing the issue probably 
weighs in favor of finding that section 847.0137 does not violate the 
First Amendment. 
2.   State Regulation of Transmission of Images  
“Harmful to Minors” 
 Whether the provisions of SB 144 that regulate the transmission 
of images “harmful to minors” violate the First Amendment presents 
a much closer question. Section 847.0138 proscribes the transmission 
of images “harmful to minors” to children in Florida. Section 847.001 
defines the term “harmful to minors” by incorporating the standard 
for obscenity established by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Califor-
nia.81 For an image to meet the three-part codified Miller standard, it 
must: (1) predominantly appeal to the prurient, shameful, or morbid 
interest of minors; (2) be patently offensive to prevailing standards in 
the adult community as to what is suitable material for minors; and 
(3) when taken as a whole, be without serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value for minors.82 Note that the focus of the inquiry 
is on whether the material is suitable for minors, rather than for the 
adult community or for society as a whole. Such an analysis is consti-
tutionally appropriate because, in Ginsberg v. New York,83 the Court 
                                                                                                                    
 78. Id. 
 79. See Act effective July 1, 2001, 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 54, at 345-46. 
 80. For instance, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported on April 19, 2001, that a Ven-
ice, Florida, public library employee was arrested for using library computers to download 
more than 190 computer disks of child pornographic images. Henry, supra note 24. 
 81. See 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). 
 82. FLA. STAT. § 847.001(6)(a)-(c) (2001). 
 83. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
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upheld a statute that prohibited selling minors materials considered 
obscene to minors even though the material was not obscene to 
adults.84 However, the Court has also said that the First Amendment 
prevents the government from banning the purchase or viewing of 
adult pornographic images by adults.85 
 If adult pornographic images are protected by the First Amend-
ment with respect to adults but not protected with respect to minors, 
how does this constitutional dichotomy affect the government’s abil-
ity to restrict access to pornographic images on the Internet? In Reno 
v. ACLU,86 (Reno) when scrutinizing the CDA, the Supreme Court 
began to address this issue. Recall that the CDA prohibited the 
transmission of harmful images to minors and the display of harmful 
images in a way that could be accessed by minors.87 In attempting to 
determine what level of First Amendment scrutiny applied to the 
Internet, the Reno Court made extensive findings about the nature of 
the Internet88 and struggled to analogize traditional communications 
systems to the Internet. 
 In evaluating the breadth of the CDA’s prohibitions, the Reno 
Court distinguished Ginsberg. The Court first noted that the statute 
at issue in Ginsberg did not bar parents from purchasing porno-
graphic magazines for their children.89 The CDA’s proscriptions, 
however, applied regardless of whether or not the parents consented 
to the Internet communications.90 Second, while the New York stat-
ute in Ginsberg applied only to commercial transactions, the CDA 
applied to all Internet communications.91 Third, the CDA did not 
properly incorporate the Miller standard, as done by the statute in 
Ginsberg.92 Finally, while the New York statute only applied to mi-
nors under age seventeen, the CDA applied to all those under age 
eighteen, thus including those minors nearest to the age of major-
ity.93 After distinguishing Ginsberg, the Court held that prior cases 
were also distinguishable from the constitutional analysis necessary 
to evaluate the CDA. Specifically, the Court stated that its prior ob-
scenity cases on administrative regulation of broadcast content94 and 
                                                                                                                    
 84. Id. at 633-34. Indeed, the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg contained exactly 
the same standard for determining whether material is “harmful to minors” as that cur-
rently embodied in section 847.001(3). 
 85. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 86. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 87. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 88. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 849-53. 
 89. Id. at 865 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 865-66. 
 94. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding a declaratory order of the 
FCC that stated that a broadcast containing repetitive use of words referring to excretory 
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zoning ordinances95 did not prevent the application of strict scrutiny 
to the CDA.96 
 Once the Court determined that precedent did not prevent the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny, the Court began the search for the best 
analogy to the Internet. To begin its analysis, the Court stated that 
each medium of expression presents its own unique circumstances 
that must be independently analyzed.97 The Court noted that, unlike 
traditional broadcast media, Internet content had not been subject to 
historical regulation.98 Additionally, according to the Court, unlike 
the more “invasive” broadcast media, Internet communications did 
not appear on a person’s computer screen unbidden, and Internet us-
ers rarely came across Internet content accidentally.99 Finally, the 
Court noted that the Internet was a much more readily available ex-
pressive commodity than the more limited broadcast spectrum.100 
Thus, the practical aspects of the Internet provided no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that content-based 
Internet restrictions received.101 
 Determining that neither precedent nor the practicalities of the 
Internet justified a less restrictive First Amendment analysis, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to the CDA and determined that the 
CDA was unconstitutionally vague. Because the CDA was a content-
based regulation of speech that provided for criminal penalties, the 
Court rigidly scrutinized the CDA’s provisions. The Court stated, 
“The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to re-
main silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, 
                                                                                                                    
and sexual activities scheduled for viewing during a time when children were the target 
audience was subject to administrative sanctions). 
 95. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordi-
nance that kept adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods). 
 96. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 866-68 (“These precedents, then, surely do not require 
us to uphold the CDA and are fully consistent with the application of the most stringent 
review of its provisions.” Id. at 868). 
 97. Id. at 868. 
 98. Id. at 868-69. This argument seems specious because widespread public use of the 
Internet has only come about in the last decade. 
 99. Id. at 869 (citing findings by the district court in the case below). The Court also 
analogized the Internet to the dial-a-porn medium previously addressed by the Court in 
Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC. Id. In Sable, the Court noted that “the dial-it medium 
requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication [and placing] a 
telephone call is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an in-
decent message.” 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989). The Court’s logic here seems to be contrary 
to the findings of the Online Victimization Report, which stated that 25% of the 1501 
youths surveyed had an unwanted exposure to pictures of naked people or people having 
sex in the previous year. Online Victimization Report, supra note 1, at ix. Additionally, new 
technology allows pop-up windows to appear on a user’s computer without the user’s initia-
tion. Many of these pop-up windows are geared toward advertisements but could easily 
contain pornography. 
 100. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870. 
 101. Id.  
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ideas, and images.”102 The Court flatly rejected the government’s ar-
gument that the CDA was no more vague than the Miller standard.103 
However, the CDA’s restrictions on “patently offensive” material did 
not fully incorporate the other two parts of the Miller standard. The 
Court indicated that to pass constitutional muster, incorporation of 
the full Miller standard was necessary to prevent the statutory re-
strictions from unduly impinging on protected speech.104 
 Despite the rigid analysis of the CDA’s provisions, the Reno Court 
reaffirmed the state’s interest in protecting children from harmful 
material.105 However, Reno stands for the proposition that even stat-
utes motivated by this compelling government interest must be care-
fully drawn so as not to place burdens on protected speech.106 The 
Reno Court was particularly concerned by the impact the CDA’s ban 
on transmission of indecent materials to minors would have on adult-
to-adult Internet communications. The government apparently ar-
gued that, by only prohibiting transmissions where the sender had 
knowledge that one of the recipients was a minor, the CDA did not 
burden communications between adults.107 However, the Court called 
this assumption an “incorrect factual premise [that was] unten-
able.”108 More importantly, the Court lamented the inability of Inter-
net users to verify the age of message recipients: 
Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the 
absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be 
charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view it. 
Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-
person chat group will be a minor—and therefore that it would be 
a crime to send the group an indecent message—would surely bur-
den communication among adults.109 
                                                                                                                    
 102. Id. at 872. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 873-74. 
 105. Id. at 875. 
 106. Indeed the Court stated, “[i]t is at least clear that the strength of the Govern-
ment’s interest in protecting minors is not equally strong throughout the coverage of this 
broad statute.” Id. at 878. 
 107. Id. at 876.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; see also id. at 855-57. Later in the opinion, the Court again rejected the gov-
ernment’s argument that the “knowledge” and “specific person” requirements of the CDA 
adequately limited the law’s scope. Id. at 880. The Court hypothesized that a person could 
manufacture knowledge and the existence of a specific person in a chat room where per-
missible adult communications were occurring by entering the chat room and announcing 
that they were seventeen years old. Id. Thus, the person would be able to enter the chat 
room and censor all of the protected adult communications by saying they were a minor 
without any way for other users to verify their age. The Court was troubled by the appar-
ent ability of one Internet user to use the criminal sanctions of the CDA to shut down le-
gitimate adult communications between other users. 
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The Court also cited with approval the findings of the district court 
that existing technology made it both unfeasible and commercially 
impractical to determine the age of users accessing material through 
e-mail, newsgroups, and chat rooms.110 The practical technical limita-
tions of age verification led to the conclusion that the CDA, in ban-
ning transmissions to minors, unduly burdened protected communi-
cations between adults. 
 Finding that the CDA was substantially overbroad to accomplish 
its purported purpose, the Court gave some examples raised by the 
litigants of less intrusive means that might legitimately accomplish 
the government’s goals: 
[t]he arguments in this Court have referred to possible alterna-
tives such as requiring that indecent material be “tagged” in a way 
that facilitates parental control of material coming into their 
homes, making exceptions for messages with artistic or educa-
tional value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and 
regulating some portions of the Internet—such as commercial Web 
sites—differently from others, such as chat rooms.111 
 In sum, Reno recognizes that government regulation of Internet 
content, even when motivated by the state’s compelling interest in 
protecting children from harmful materials, will be strictly scruti-
nized. Measures must be narrowly tailored to ensure they do not un-
necessarily impinge on the rights of adult users. In the absence of 
genuine age verification technology to ensure users that those to 
whom they are communicating are not minors, merely banning 
transmission to minors of harmful materials without protections for 
adult communications exceeds the boundaries of the government’s 
interests.112 The Court’s dictum clearly favors self-regulation by par-
ents over criminal laws. 
 In ACLU v. Johnson,113 another case invalidating a state statute 
whose provisions are closely analogous to section 847.0138, the Tenth 
Circuit applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Reno to a New 
Mexico statute.114 The statute outlawed the knowing initiation of 
communication with a person under eighteen by means of a computer 
when the communication depicted material harmful to minors.115 Ap-
plying strict scrutiny, the Johnson court noted the state’s compelling 
interest but stressed that regulation could only be accomplished by 
                                                                                                                    
 110. Id. at 876. 
 111. Id. at 879. 
 112. A recent article criticizes the assumption that age verification on the Internet is 
impossible. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 809-10 (2001). 
 113. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 114. See id. (invalidating N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie 1998)). 
 115. Id. at 1152. 
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the least restrictive means.116 Attempting to address concerns about 
the statute’s effect on adult communications, the state argued that 
the statute only restricted communications made solely to an indi-
vidual minor recipient.117 According to the state, group communica-
tions were not included within the statute’s proscription. The court 
rejected this argument both because it was not founded in the stat-
ute’s language and because it would achieve the absurd result of al-
lowing a sender to escape criminality by sending the same harmful 
material to two minors instead of to one.118 The Johnson court also 
rejected the state’s argument that the knowledge requirement lim-
ited the statute’s applicability, citing the same reasons used by the 
Supreme Court in Reno.119 Because the statute unconstitutionally 
burdened adult communications, the court found the statute violated 
the First Amendment.120 
 Section 847.0138, by prohibiting the transmission of materials 
“harmful to minors,” raises many of the constitutional concerns ad-
dressed by the Court in Reno and by the Tenth Circuit in Johnson. 
Unlike both the CDA and the New Mexico statute in Johnson, sec-
tion 847.0138 contains no good-faith defenses; however, because 
section 847.0138 only applies to transmissions via electronic mail 
communications, it is significantly more narrow in the range of com-
munications it restricts. Although the term “electronic mail” is not 
defined in the statute, it would presumably only include e-mail, and 
not other types of communications such as chat rooms, newsgroups, 
or postings on web pages. Thus, section 847.0138 contemplates the 
Court’s statement in Reno that different types of content sources can 
be regulated differently. 
 Despite the statute’s focused regulation of e-mails, the scope of the 
content prohibition on e-mails is fairly broad. Section 847.0138 ap-
plies to defendants who “knew or believed” they were transmitting 
an image harmful to minors “to a specific individual known by the 
defendant to be a minor” in Florida.121 Thus, if a person either knew 
or had the subjective belief that they were sending a pornographic 
image to a minor, they would run afoul of the statute. The over-
breadth of this mens rea requirement is potentially problematic. 
Given the Supreme Court’s assumption that knowledge of a recipi-
ent’s age could be easily attributed to any person in a large chat 
room, knowledge could be similarly imputed to any adult who is 
                                                                                                                    
 116. Id. at 1156. 
 117. Id. at 1159. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873-74 (1997).  
 120. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160. The court also found the statute violated the Com-
merce Clause. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 121. FLA. STAT. § 847.0138(2) (2001). 
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sending an e-mail to a large list of recipients. Just as the knowledge 
requirement in Reno and Johnson could not effectively limit the un-
constitutional chilling effect on legitimate adult-to-adult communica-
tions, a court might also find that the knowledge requirement here 
does not save section 847.0138.122 
 Even broader than the knowledge requirement criticized in both 
Reno and Johnson, section 847.0138 also allows prosecution if the de-
fendant believed he was sending the image to a minor. While permit-
ting prosecution for subjective beliefs may help the enforceability of 
the statute, an adult sender may self-censor rather than send legiti-
mate pornographic communications for fear that they may later be 
imputed with belief that a recipient was a minor. Further, the state’s 
compelling interest in protecting children is significantly weaker 
when applied to a situation where the recipient was not a minor even 
though the sender believes the recipient to be. Taken in this context, 
the belief standard appears to have an even broader chilling effect on 
adult-to-adult communications than the knowledge standard. Given 
the strict scrutiny likely to be applied to the statute, the belief stan-
dard will be difficult to uphold. 
 The requirement that the defendant have “actual knowledge” or 
“believe” that the e-mail recipient is a minor seems either utterly un-
enforceable or constitutionally problematic. The Reno court noted the 
near technological impossibility of identifying and verifying the age 
of a particular Internet user.123 While credit card verification could be 
used by commercial Web sites to restrict access to pornography, such 
an option is not available for e-mail. There is virtually no way for an 
individual sending an e-mail to verify the age of the recipient prior to 
sending the message, short of sending a prior e-mail asking “Are you 
an adult?” A person’s e-mail address provides no indication of the 
person’s age. For the sender to have “actual knowledge” that the re-
cipient was a minor, the sender would practically have to know the 
physical identity of the recipient. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the belief standard is overinclusive. If the defendant is charged with 
“believing” the recipient was a minor, then the lack of age verifica-
tion could create the belief that the recipient is a minor in almost 
every instance when the sender did not know the physical identity of 
the recipient. In every instance when an adult sends a pornographic 
                                                                                                                    
 122. Indeed the requirement that the e-mail be sent to a specific individual known to 
be a minor is likely to be criticized for the same reasons stated by the courts in Johnson 
and Reno. Unlike Johnson, however, the requirement that the communication be directed 
at a specific individual exists plainly in the statute. When defending section 847.0138, the 
state may argue that this provision limits the statute to e-mails only sent to a single mi-
nor. However, such an argument could significantly undercut the statute’s enforcement be-
cause a person could just send a copy of the e-mail to a minor and another person and es-
cape the statute’s purview. 
 123. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 876-77. 
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e-mail, the adult will be forced to verify the recipient’s age prior to 
sending the e-mail. The effect is to impose an age verification re-
quirement on all pornographic e-mails, a result that is a potentially 
overbroad restriction of constitutionally protected adult-to-adult 
communications. Such a standard is unlikely to survive strict scru-
tiny. 
B.   The Dormant Commerce Clause Implications of SB 144 
 Despite the potential First Amendment problems imposed by SB 
144, an even more damaging constitutional infirmity may prohibit 
the enforcement of both sections 847.0137 and 847.0138 altogether. 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, several 
courts have held that state statutes functionally equivalent to those 
created by SB 144 violate the dormant Commerce Clause. This con-
stitutional theory, rooted in notions of federalism, presents a court 
with a choice between federal and state regulation of a particular 
subject matter. A holding that a statute violates the dormant Com-
merce Clause precludes state regulation in the area altogether. Thus, 
if SB 144 were found to violate the dormant Commerce Clause, there 
is virtually no legislative cure for the constitutional infirmity. At 
least one commentator has referred to dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence as “‘a nuclear bomb of a legal theory’ against state Inter-
net regulations.”124 
 Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is a judge-made doctrine 
with a long history and a focus on principles of federalism. Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate com-
merce “among the several States.”125 While the Commerce Clause is 
an affirmative grant of power to Congress, courts have invalidated 
state laws that are either facially discriminatory126 or that unduly 
burden127 interstate commerce, even where Congress has not taken 
action in the field. The analysis focuses on whom, Congress or the 
states, has the power to regulate in a particular area. 
 There are generally four independent legal theories by which a 
state law may be invalidated on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 
While any of these theories could be grounds for unconstitutionality, 
courts typically use several of the theories as support for their hold-
ings.128 Which analysis is applicable in a given case depends on the 
nature of the state regulation. The first two theories have been said 
                                                                                                                    
 124. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 112, at 787 (quoting Declan McCullagh, Brick by 
Brick, TIME DIGITAL DAILY (Jan. 31, 1997), at http://www.onmagazine.com/on-mag/reviews/ 
article/0,9985,11738,00.html). 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 126. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 127. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 128. See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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to form “the core of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”129 
First, the central prohibition of dormant Commerce Clause cases is 
on protectionist state regulation that discriminates against out-of-
state actors.130 State regulation that facially discriminates against 
out-of-state actors is strictly scrutinized and will only be upheld if 
there is a substantial local purpose and no available nondiscrimina-
tory alternative.131 Under the second theory, where a state law is fa-
cially neutral but nevertheless burdens interstate commerce, courts 
balance the burden imposed on interstate commerce against the local 
benefit to a legitimate local public interest. Facially neutral statutes 
having a legitimate public interest and only incidental impacts on in-
terstate commerce are usually upheld unless the burden is “clearly 
excessive” in relation to the benefits.132 
 While the first two theories form “the core” of dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis, the latter two analyses are particularly important in 
the Internet context, though they are not as well defined. Under the 
third theory, an unconstitutional “extraterritorial effect” arises 
where state legislation has the practical effect of regulating conduct 
beyond the state’s borders. If the statute attempts to substantially 
regulate conduct beyond the state’s borders, the statute violates the 
Commerce Clause.133 This formulation of the Commerce Clause is 
also supported by the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process 
Clauses, which prohibit state regulation of out-of-state conduct 
unless it creates a “significant contact” with the state.134 Finally, un-
der the fourth theory, the dormant Commerce Clause prevents states 
from creating regulations that “adversely affect interstate commerce 
by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations.”135 While the 
scope of the inconsistent-regulations analysis is unclear, this analy-
                                                                                                                    
 129. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 112, at 789. 
 130. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987). 
 131. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). The practical effect of this 
standard is that statutes facially discriminating against out-of-state actors are virtually 
per se invalid. 
 132. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 133. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). In Healy, the Court stated that “the 
‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes 
place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within 
the State.’” Id. (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982)). Some commen-
tators have stated that this formulation of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is 
“clearly too broad.” Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 112, at 790. Professors Goldsmith and 
Sykes propose a balancing test where the benefits to the regulating jurisdiction would be 
weighed against the overall burden on commerce. Id. at 802-03. This approach adopts the 
economic philosophy that societal utility is increased where the overall benefits of regula-
tion exceed the burdens. 
 134. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 112, at 789 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)). 
 135. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88. 
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sis has been used as support by courts analyzing legislation similar 
to SB 144.136 
1.   Case Law Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause  
to Similar Legislation 
 A number of courts have struck down state legislation prohibiting 
the transmission of images harmful to minors to persons under age 
eighteen, similar to section 847.0138, as a violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.137 American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki was the first 
case to apply the dormant Commerce Clause analysis and has been 
followed by several courts in striking down similar legislation.138 In 
American Libraries Ass’n, a number of organizations sought a pre-
liminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of a New York statute 
that made it a crime for an individual, knowing a communication’s 
content was harmful to minors, to use any electronic device to initi-
ate or engage in a communication with a minor.139 The statute ap-
pears to have been broadly drafted to include display of images 
harmful to minors on a Web site as well as person-to-person commu-
nications. The statute provided four affirmative defenses to prosecu-
tion: (1) the defendant made a reasonable effort to determine the age 
of the recipient but was prevented from doing so by the minor; (2) the 
defendant made a good-faith effort to restrict access to the harmful 
materials; (3) the defendant restricted access by requiring a credit 
card or adult personal identification number prior to use; and (4) the 
defendant reasonably segregated harmful material allowing it to be 
blocked by PC user-based screening software.140 
 After discussing the various types of Internet communications, 
the court noted the significant federalism concerns raised by deciding 
who properly should regulate Internet content.141 However, the court 
reasoned that the New York statute should be properly analyzed un-
der the dormant Commerce Clause.142 The court stated: 
I find . . . that the Internet is analogous to a highway or railroad. 
This determination means that the phrase “information super-
highway” is more than a mere buzzword; it has legal significance, 
                                                                                                                    
 136. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 137. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); PSINet Inc. v. Chapman, 
108 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2000); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. 
Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 167. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 163 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21). Addi-
tionally, New York Penal Law section 235.20(6), quoted in id., defined “harmful to minors” 
in a way nearly identical to Florida’s definition found in section 847.001. 
 140. Id. at 163-64. 
 141. Id. at 167-68. 
 142. Id. at 167 (“The Internet fits easily within the parameters of interests tradition-
ally protected by the Commerce Clause.”). 
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because the similarity between the Internet and more traditional 
instruments of interstate commerce leads to analysis under the 
Commerce Clause.143 
The court found the New York law violated the Commerce Clause for 
three reasons. First, the law unconstitutionally projected New York 
law into conduct that occurred wholly outside New York’s borders.144 
Second, the law, despite its legitimate purpose, imposed burdens on 
interstate commerce that “clearly exceed[ed]” the local benefits.145 
Third, according to the court, the Internet had to be set aside as a 
“national preserve” to protect users from inconsistent state regula-
tions.146 
 When determining the statute unconstitutionally projected New 
York law into other states, the court found that the inability of 
Internet users to reliably verify either the geographic location or age 
of persons with whom they are communicating made the statute con-
stitutionally problematic.147 The court did not fully address its con-
cerns about the problems of age verification.148 Because geographic 
locations were largely irrelevant on the Internet, the court found that 
most users neither knew nor cared about the physical geographic lo-
cation of the Internet resources they used.149 Additionally, e-mail ad-
dresses provided no clear indication of a user’s geographic location.150 
Even where a person’s e-mail address might give an indication of the 
geographic location of the computer where they maintain an e-mail 
                                                                                                                    
 143. Id. at 161. 
 144. Id. at 169.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. Specifically the court stated: 
[T]he Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a 
national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to 
its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether. Thus, 
the Commerce Clause ordains that only Congress can legislate in this area, 
subject, of course, to whatever limitations other provisions of the Constitution 
(such as the First Amendment) may require. 
Id. 
 147. Id. at 167. 
 148. For a more detailed treatment of the problem of age verification on the Internet, 
see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 855-56 (1997). For a contrary view that age verification 
procedures can be reasonably implemented, see Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 112, at 
815-16. However, note that Professors Goldsmith and Sykes never squarely address the is-
sue of the cost of compliance to an individual citizen who must verify the age, geographic 
location, and controlling law of the recipient of a pornographic e-mail prior to sending the 
e-mail. Rather, Professors Goldsmith and Sykes note that, “[b]ecause there is no cost-
effective way (at present) to identify e-mail addresses by geography, [the sender] must take 
these steps for e-mail recipients in jurisdictions where these steps are not required.” Id. at 
813. This observation strikes to the core of the overbreadth and extraterritoriality prob-
lems posed by state regulation. 
 149. Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 170. 
 150. In fact, URLs and e-mail addresses are translated into Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dresses by the Domain Name System (DNS). For a more detailed discussion of the DNS, 
see infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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account, it still did not clearly indicate the geographic location of the 
person receiving the e-mail.151 According to the court, the New York 
law could not be construed in a way to limit it purely to intrastate 
communications because an Internet user could not reliably restrict 
their communications solely to New York recipients.152 Because the 
law would apply more broadly to Web site postings by New Yorkers, 
the court also noted that a person who posts information to a Web 
site could not, because of difficulties identifying web users, prevent 
users from a specific state from accessing the Web site.153 The fact 
that Internet users in other states would self-censor themselves to 
avoid violating the statute, even in communications with non-New 
Yorkers, projected the New York law onto citizens in other states and 
regulated conduct wholly outside New York—both direct violations of 
the Commerce Clause.154 
 The court also found that the law was an invalid indirect regula-
tion of interstate commerce because it imposed excessive burdens on 
interstate commerce when compared to the local benefits.155 Accept-
ing the state’s legitimate interest in protecting minors from harmful 
material, the court found that the local benefits from the law were 
“not overwhelming.”156 The court specifically cited the unenforceabil-
ity of the law against foreign entities, the source of a majority of the 
regulated communications, and the difficulty with asserting criminal 
jurisdiction over violators.157 The court also noted that other laws 
adequately protected children and that no criminal prosecutions had 
been successfully brought under the statute.158 In contrast, the court 
found the burden on interstate commerce to be extreme because the 
category of harmful materials was wider than the state suggested 
and individuals would be forced to self-censor themselves to avoid 
the risk of prosecution.159 The resulting chilling effect posed an un-
reasonable burden on interstate commerce in comparison to the mar-
ginal local benefits. 
                                                                                                                    
 151. Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 171. Since the court’s opinion in 1997, this 
phenomenon has only increased. Today, web-based e-mail allows a user to maintain an e-
mail account on a particular server and easily receive e-mails from that account, through 
the World Wide Web, from any computer anywhere in the world. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. Even if a content provider could maintain parallel sites for each state, as many 
providers maintain multilingual sites, the compliance costs could be unduly burdensome. 
 154. Id. at 177, 180. The court’s analysis is a classic example of the application of the 
extraterritorial aspect of the Commerce Clause. The court properly stated that the founda-
tion of the extraterritorial analysis lies in “a recognition that true protection of each state’s 
respective authority is only possible when such limits are observed by all states.” Id. at 
176. 
 155. Id. at 177. 
 156. Id. at 178. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 179. 
 159. Id. at 180. 
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 Finally, in its most sweeping statement, the American Libraries 
Ass’n court found that the New York statute would unconstitution-
ally subject Internet users to inconsistent state regulations. Specifi-
cally, the court stated: 
The courts have long recognized that certain types of commerce 
demand consistent treatment and are therefore susceptible to 
regulation only on a national level. The Internet represents one of 
those areas; effective regulation will require national, and more 
likely global, cooperation. Regulation by any single state can only 
result in chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws 
subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations. Without the 
limitation’s [sic] imposed by the Commerce Clause, these inconsis-
tent regulatory schemes could paralyze the development of the 
Internet altogether.160 
The court analogized the Internet to the rail and highway systems 
the Supreme Court had previously stated were subject to national 
regulation. For instance, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. 
v. Illinois,161 the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute pur-
porting to establish interstate railway rates and held that railway 
rates were of a general and national character, subject only to regu-
lation by Congress.162 Similarly, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex 
rel. Sullivan,163 the Court struck down an Arizona statute that lim-
ited the length of trains for the same reason.164 The American Librar-
ies Ass’n court found that the Internet, like the rail and highway sys-
tems, necessitated a single, cohesive scheme of national regulations 
in order to prevent users from becoming subject to innumerable and 
conflicting local regulations.165 
2.   The Correctness of the American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki 
Court’s Approach to State Internet Regulation 
 If taken literally, the American Libraries Ass’n decision would 
seem to preclude states from regulating any type of Internet commu-
nication because of the Commerce Clause implications. The breadth 
of this result has been the subject of debate among commentators.166 
Both the mechanical construct of the Internet and the practical reali-
ties of Internet use support the court’s factual findings about the 
Internet and the court’s transportation analogy. 
                                                                                                                    
 160. Id. at 181. 
 161. 118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
 162. Id. at 574-75. 
 163. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 164. Id. at 767. 
 165. Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 182. 
 166. Compare Goldmsith & Sykes, supra note 112, with Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, 
Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation 
Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889 (1998). 
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 The Internet looks a lot like a highway or railroad system, except 
that it moves bits instead of people or goods. The Internet is a vast, 
decentralized network of computers that is not controlled by any cen-
tral authority. High speed communications networks are the back-
bones of the Internet that link regional computer networks, such as 
Internet service providers (ISPs), together making a network of net-
works.167 Every computer attached to the Internet is uniquely identi-
fied by an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a series of four numbers 
separated by dots, such as 123.45.67.89.168 The Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS) uses a hierarchy to convert IP addresses into more easily 
recognizable words.169 Each domain maintains a list matching textual 
names and IP addresses of computers in the domains below it, and 
subordinate domains can develop below.170 When an e-mail is sent, 
the DNS converts the textual name into its corresponding IP address 
so the Internet communications protocol knows the destination of a 
packet of information. When dissecting an e-mail address, the por-
tion of the address to the left of the “@” sign is the username and the 
portion to the right identifies the specific computer where the recipi-
ent has an e-mail account. None of these aspects of the Internet give 
any consistently reliable indication of either the age or geographic lo-
cation of an Internet user. For instance, I could set up a server 
named “florida.com.” While persons sending me e-mail at rmar-
tin@florida.com might assume that I am in Florida, I could just as 
easily set the server up with the same domain name in Idaho. The 
DNS assigns the “.com,” “.edu,” or “.gov” based on a categorization of 
the function of the domain rather than its physical location. Identifi-
cation becomes even more ambiguous when the recipient’s name is 
something more generic like mel84@aol.com. Thus, neither the DNS 
nor the structure of a recipient’s e-mail address provides a clear indi-
cation of, and may even give false indications of, the recipient’s geo-
graphic location. 
 Once one understands exactly how information travels across the 
Internet, it becomes clear that the Internet is even more an instru-
ment of interstate commerce than the railroad and highway net-
works analogized by the American Libraries Ass’n court. Information 
travels across the Internet like cars and railcars travel on highways 
and railroads. The Internet uses two communications protocols: 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP), 
commonly referred to as TCP/IP. TCP/IP uses a packet switched 
network with no direct connection between the sending and receiving 
                                                                                                                    
 167. See PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 7 (Millennium ed. 1999). 
 168. Id. at 17. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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computers.171 Instead, every piece of information, no matter how 
large or small, is broken into one or more numbered packets that are 
sent over many different routes at the same time and reassembled at 
the destination.172 As a packet travels, it passes through routers that 
examine the packet’s destination IP address.173 Each router deter-
mines the most efficient path for sending the packet to the next clos-
est router to the packet’s destination.174 Fluctuating traffic loads 
might mean that packets might be sent along different routes and 
may arrive out of order.175 Indeed the random nature of the routing 
process means that the same packets of an e-mail message, if sent 
several times, would probably travel different routes each time. Any 
packet that was corrupted in transmission is discarded by the desti-
nation computer and the destination computer asks the sending 
computer to retransmit the corrupted packet.176 When all noncorrupt 
packets are received by the destination computer, the message is re-
assembled.177 Imagine a twenty-car train leaving New York bound for 
Los Angeles. Using TCP/IP to determine the train’s path, each car 
would be sent separately and would have no predetermined route. 
Instead, at each town, the car would decide the quickest way to the 
next closest town. When all the cars finally arrived at the station, 
they would be reassembled shortly before the train entered the sta-
tion in Los Angeles. 
 Just as the national railroad and highway networks are funda-
mentally the channels of interstate commerce, so is the national net-
work of information. Instead of railcars or semi-trucks carrying 
goods, the Internet is a network of computers carrying packets of in-
formation. Even more significantly, the road signs178 on the Internet 
provide no information about physical location. Indeed, due to the lo-
cation of the sending and receiving computers, communications that 
seem to be between persons in the same state might actually travel 
through several different states to reach their destination.179 In an 
                                                                                                                    
 171. Id. at 13. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 15. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. That is, computer and user names and IP addresses. 
 179. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Even if [the statute] 
is limited to one-on-one e-mail communications . . . there is no guarantee that a message 
from one New Mexican to another New Mexican will not travel through other states en 
route.”); see also Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (find-
ing that a New York statute “cannot effectively be limited to purely intrastate communica-
tions over the Internet because no such communications exist”). In an even more interest-
ing case, United States v. Kammersell, a bomb threat sent via AOL instant message by a 
Utah teenager to get his Utah girlfriend out of work was deemed a threat transmitted 
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economy based on the flow of information rather than the flow of 
goods, the necessity for uniform nationwide regulations is fundamen-
tal to national prosperity. Just as the Commerce Clause prevents 
states from unreasonably restricting the flow of legitimate goods 
through their territory, the same analysis should prevent states from 
unreasonably restricting the flow of constitutionally protected infor-
mation amongst the states. The geographic anonymity of Internet 
communications causes citizens in states with no regulation or dif-
ferent regulations than Florida to be forced to comply with Florida’s 
regulation for fear that the person with whom they are communicat-
ing might be a Florida resident. The result is that Internet users will 
be forced to comply with the most stringent state’s regulations in or-
der to ensure they do not break any state’s law. The potential for con-
flicting regulations was a concern of the court in American Libraries 
Ass’n. The compliance costs placed on out-of-state actors is typical ex-
traterritorial regulation180 and would result in dysfunctionally incon-
sistent state regulations181 that the Supreme Court has said violates 
the Commerce Clause. Further, even if geographic location were 
readily identifiable, forcing Internet users to determine the locale of 
the recipient of their communication and the applicable state regula-
tory prohibitions on Internet communications would reduce the now 
instantaneous communication process to a crawl. Such compliance 
costs cannot be in the nation’s best interests. 
 Additionally, Congress has already attempted to address the is-
sue. Congress, which the Constitution explicitly authorizes to regu-
late interstate commerce, is not restrained by the dormant Com-
merce Clause. Although Congress’s power is limited by other consti-
tutional provisions, such as the First Amendment, Congress alone 
has the power to craft national regulations guaranteeing some meas-
ure of consistency for Internet users. The Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA) is Congress’s most recent attempt to do just that. While 
COPA is limited to commercial speech, it represents a first step in at-
tempting to address the issue of access to harmful material by mi-
nors on the Internet. The legal challenges to COPA currently work-
ing their way to the Supreme Court182 will clarify the scope of Con-
gress’s power in this area. State laws, such as SB 144, only add to the 
growing regulatory inconsistency that Internet users face. 
                                                                                                                    
through interstate commerce because the message was sent through America Online’s in-
stant message server in Virginia. 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 180. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 181. See S. Pac. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 773-74 (1945) (deciding that 
Arizona train length law unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce because it effec-
tively controlled the length of trains across entire interstate train line); Wabash, St. Louis 
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1886). 
 182. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 121 S.Ct. 1997 (2001). 
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 The Florida Legislature was certainly aware of the dormant 
Commerce Clause implications of SB 144 and attempted to narrowly 
draft the bill to avoid constitutional infirmity.183 As enacted, a person 
only “transmits” a prohibited image under section 847.0138 when the 
person sends an e-mail “to a specific individual known by the defen-
dant to be a minor”184 in Florida. Apparently, to commit the crime, 
the sender must have knowledge that the recipient is in Florida.185 
However, this provision may be so narrowly drafted as to render it 
difficult to enforce. Because of the geographic anonymity of Internet 
communications, the defendant could plausibly raise the defense that 
he or she did not know the recipient was in Florida. Further, even 
where the e-mail address may give some indication of Florida resi-
dence, though they rarely do, the defendant could argue that he or 
she thought the e-mail address did not correspond to the recipient’s 
physical location. Thus, unless there is some clear, objective manifes-
tation of the defendant’s knowledge that the recipient is in Florida, 
the prosecution will be faced with the more difficult task of proving 
the defendant’s subjective beliefs. 
 In the old economy, dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
prevented states from adopting regulations that unduly restricted 
the interstate flow of goods. In an economy based on the free flow of 
information, state laws that unduly restrict information flows should 
be stringently scrutinized. The Commerce Clause envisions a na-
tional marketplace, whether for goods or information. Even though 
SB 144 may have a legitimate purpose in protecting children from 
adult pornography, it will likely face the same dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny that similar laws in other states have faced. Further, 
a national scheme of regulation is currently in its formative stages, 
and Congress can effectively shape national policy that protects chil-
dren and guarantees at least a degree of uniformity to Internet users. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 SB 144 is likely to face significant judicial scrutiny. Because child 
pornography receives virtually no constitutional protection, the parts 
of SB 144 dealing with child pornography are much more likely to 
withstand constitutional attack than the parts prohibiting transmis-
                                                                                                                    
 183. In fact, the bill analysis for the House companion measure, HB 203, warned of the 
dormant Commerce Clause implications. See Staff Analysis for HB 203, 2001 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Fla. 2001), available at www.leg.state.fl.us (last visited July 21, 2001). 
 184. FLA. STAT. § 847.0138(1)(b) (2001). 
 185. The belief standard that also exists in the statute could arguably punish a person 
for sending an e-mail to a minor he believed was in Florida even though the minor was ac-
tually in another state. While Florida may have a legitimate interest in protecting children 
in its own state, its interests most likely do not extend to protection of children outside its 
borders. 
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sion of images harmful to minors. The provisions of SB 144 prohibit-
ing e-mails containing images “harmful to minors” may run afoul of 
the First Amendment. Both provisions may violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Nobody denies that the anonymity provided by 
technology has made the Internet a mechanism for sexual exploita-
tion of children. The questions that must be answered are which gov-
ernment entity is going to regulate the conduct and how those regu-
lations are going to be tailored to protect constitutional freedoms. 
While protecting children from online exposure to adult pornographic 
materials is laudable, the inability for Internet users to determine 
the age and geographic location of the recipient of their communica-
tions could make Internet users in other states unknowingly run 
afoul of Florida’s law. As other states respond to political pressures 
to pass similar laws, the multiplicity of regulations over the same na-
tional information network could frustrate legitimate information 
flows in a way that is contrary to the nation’s best interests. Com-
prehensive national regulation of Internet transmission of adult and 
child pornography is currently being addressed by Congress and the 
federal courts. The Supreme Court’s scrutiny of these laws will likely 
shape the boundaries of government’s ability to regulate in this area. 
Until these areas have been more fully addressed by the federal 
courts, states should resist the temptation to pass laws that broadly 
prohibit this type of Internet conduct. 
